Sarkohi



The Seeds of Freedom Are Sown in Iran By Faraj Sarkohi, Iran A few months prior to February 1978, in the turbulent days of the Islamic revolution, newspaper vendors in Iran had to cope, after years of stagnation, with an onrush of people passionately eager to purchase newspapers. People thronged the streets, demanding freedom. The Shah's censorship machine had to retreat in the face of the people and the journalists, who, almost unable to believe it, gradually came to feel the ever greater power of the printed word and freedom of information. There was an incredible increase in the circulation, delivery, influence and quantity of books and periodicals. The Iranian society rapidly developed in the new atmosphere, in conditions of freedom of speech and free spread of information. Young talents and intellectuals, who had not cooperated before with the tight-lipped and censorship-stifled press, were now eager to cooperate with it. But within two years of the revolution the new regime was firmly entrenched. The ruling fundamentalists established their undivided domination over culture, reduced culture to the use of simple and stereotyped clichés, monopolized all the mass media, destroyed the independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), foisted on the people a single tightly-knit ideology, and blocked the discussion of different views and opinions and the free circulation of news and information. Before mounting an attack on parties and independent political and trade union organizations, they fell upon the press and book publishing, and imposed an official and unofficial censorship on writers. In 1981, within less than one month, most of the publications were closed down. In accordance with a statement issued by the revolutionary Islamic prosecutor's office, some 150 newspapers and magazines were closed down and more than 25 writers and journalists were arrested during one night in 1981. Professional organizations of writers and journalists were outlawed, while the Secretary of the Society of Writers if Iran Said Sultan Pur, a poet whose works called to revolt against oppression, was executed. Journalists were left to sit at home, while the newspaper stalls lost their clients once again. The closure of the free press and the imposition of political and ideological censorship on book publishing opened the way to despotic rule. This time, the ancient tradition of oriental despotism was established within the framework of the tyranny of Islamic fundamentalists in place of the Shah's dictatorship. The outcome was that a century of struggle by the Iranians for modernization and democracy ended without result. But the bitter and painful experience of Shah despotism and the twenty-year sanguinary experience of fundamentalist tyranny showed that the Iranians' age-old dreams of industrialization, modernization, and economic and social progress could not come true without freedom of speech and development of culture, while the revolution in communications had made the establishment of totalitarian power impossible at any rate, in the field of information exchange. The Islamic Republic have used the most powerful and sophisticated methods of physical and ideological suppression in order to impose an atmosphere of total silence and to turn Iran into a kind of graveyard, but it was nevertheless taken aback by the people movement and the resistance on the part of writers and journalists. Writers and journalists kept publishing open letters, articles and literary works demanding an end to censorship. In the most stifling years, writers and journalists sought to combat the despotism in various ways, notably by using Aesopian language in their works. At the Ministry of Islamic Culture, the despotic rulers set up an administration which was to censor all books, especially textbooks. A list of banned expressions, feelings, thoughts and news items was drawn up. Any attempt to ignore the red-pencilled places entailed such punishments as prohibition to write, closure of periodicals, deprivation of the right to literary activity, imprisonment, whipping and capital punishment. Every few years, bodies of writers and journalists with traces of torture were found in deserted localities in the suburbs of towns and cities. Groups of government supporters, either pretending to be independent groups or with the aid of the local police and the government press, used such methods as the planting of explosive devices in the offices of periodicals and the beating up of writers and journalists to create an atmosphere of fear and terror. The police intensified their pressure on writers and journalists by summoning them to police stations for repeated interrogation. The Ministry of Information and the security police established their control over the safety, the life and even the souls of writers. A special law was announced under which publication of any edition was only possible upon the receipt of a special permit issued by the Ministry of Islamic Culture after consultations with the Ministry of Information. And it was only a couple of years ago that such a permit, with the exception of three or four cases, the more so with respect to nonpolitical, literary and artistic journals, was issued only to organizations whose loyalty to the regime was beyond doubt. The Internal Press Administration of the Ministry of Islamic Orientation and the Culture Department of the Ministry of Information are keeping a close watch on printed publications. Holders of licenses for publishing activity make a point of censoring prepared materials, stories and novels of their own accord, either out of loyalty to the government or for fear of the numerous punishments, as announced in the Press Law, which declares as criminal such cases as criticism of the fundamentals of Islam, insult of clerics or the religious leader, or expression of protest with respect to the laws and traditions discriminating against women. The restrictions in the Press Law are all-embracing and are drawn up in such a way as to allow any interpretation, so that they may be applied to any critical remark. The security police have also given a definite orientation to the press and the work of writers by means of their brutal methods. In May 1998, more than 20 million of the 28 million Iranian voters, in conditions when the country was in the grip of a grave economic crisis, when unemployment and inflation had grown to vast proportions, while the fundamentalists' candidate made promises of rapid growth and prosperity, gave their votes for a candidate who had no economic program and who merely spoke about a liberalization of the political atmosphere, freedom of the press and other sociopolitical freedoms and, of course, about limitations on the clerical system of power. It is almost a year and a half now since Mr Khatami was elected president, but the censoring of books has continued in the old way, and a license for publishing activity is still being issued to those who are loyal to one of the branches of power or to those who keep their publishing activity within the narrow framework of censorship. Thus, independent professional journalists are deprived of the right to publishing activity and must work in publications operating within the framework of censorship. The twentieth anniversary of the Islamic revolution is being marked at a time when less than four months have passed since the day of the murder of Dariush Forouhar and his wife Parvane Forouhar, the destruction of the leaders of the Mellyate Iran Party and well-known critics of the despotic regime; since the day of the disappearance and murder of the translator Mohammad Jafar Sharif, the translator and writer Mohammad Paritana, and the poet and writer Mohammad Mokhtari. The two last-named persons were among the active members of the Society of Writers of Iran, among those who over the past 18 years worked to restore Iran's first and most important independent nongovernmental organization, and who had again and again been officially threatened with death. These murders are not something exceptional. Eighteen years ago, the Ministry of Information and the security police began to carry out illegal killings of critics of the system without the sanction of any court of law. The first in this series was the murder or Kazem Sami, a well-known critic of the despotic regime. Six years ago, when independent writers came out in protest against censorship by publishing a text entitled "Appeal by 134 Writers", the Ministry of Information murdered the translator Ahmad Mir Alai. And two years ago everything began with the murder of the poet Gofar Hoseini and the kidnapping of the writer Faraj sarkohi, editor-in-chief of an independent socio-literary publication and an activist of the Society of Writers of Iran, who was tortured and then put to death. Freedom was being stifled on an ever greater scale. In all these cases, the crimes were attributed to foreign states and to the opposition. With respect to the latest crimes, however, a different approach became inevitable. In these days of the 20th anniversary of the Islamic revolution, the press and the sociopolitical circles of Iran speak more often of the latest statement issued by the Ministry of Information of Iran, the political security police and a team of investigators. As a result of mounting pressure on the part of the people and in view of the protests of world opinion and the contradictions within the regime itself (and these have become especially acute after the election of the new president), the statement said that the latest killings had been carried out by a few officials of the Ministry of Information. The statement was assessed as positive, but it did not cheer anyone except groups closely allied with the ruling circles. All the available evidence and the experience of people like myself show that the Ministry of Information has become an organization which, acting on instructions from the higher organs of power and under one and the same scenario, repeated from time to time, secretly kills prominent and influential critics of the system and members of the opposition both at home and abroad. Such acts were carried out most brutally against writers and journalists who had sought freedom of activity for their professional organizations and freedom of speech, and who had over the past twenty years protested against the official and unofficial censorship being imposed on the orders of government agencies and through pressure groups. That is why the demand for participation of a group chosen by independent international organizations such as PEN and by representatives of the Society of Writers of Iran in the investigation of the killings was wholeheartedly supported by the intelligentsia and the people of Iran. But this proposal was rejected even by the political wing of Mr Khatami, which takes a more liberal and balanced attitude to Islam and which is in disagreement with the clandestine killings without trial. After the elections, owing to such factors as the more liberal frame of mind of the new president and his followers, who have taken control of some power structures, and because of the growing pressure from the people and the persevering struggle of writers and journalists, freedom of speech was enhanced and new publications were issued. More people thronged round the bookstalls in that freer atmosphere. But from the beginning of 1998, the pressure was intensified once again. More than 10 publications were closed down, among them large-circulation newspapers protecting the new president, Mr Khatami, and from time to time carrying items by critics of the regime. Writers were officially warned that they had no right to set up their own trade union organizations. The censoring of books, which had been slightly relaxed, was back to its previous state, and the Minister of Islamic Orientation, who had initially promised to make the situation freer, officially announced that censorship of books and periodicals would be continued. The election of the new president gave fresh hope of activity by parties, political organizations and trade unions. Women and young people, who had played an important role in holding the elections, hoped that the fierce discrimination against women would be adjusted and that promising prospects would open up before young people. Most of the people hoped that the all-pervading control of the private life of citizens would be limited, nurturing hopes like buds on trees eagerly awaiting their time to blossom. In foreign policy, the new government seeks to re-establish relations with Europe and America. But in the sphere of relations with America there are a great many obstacles, including stiff resistance on the part of the fundamentalists. The economic crisis both in he country and in the society is rapidly gathering momentum towards its peak. And while the contribution by young people to the development of the Iranian society is very great, the country now has some 10 million unemployed. Inflation has markedly increased. The shrinking oil revenues and the state's inability to attract foreign capital, corruption in the society, and other economic phenomena have dangerously aggravated the economic and social hardships. Meanwhile, women and young people stand shoulder to shoulder with the intelligentsia and other social strata demanding democracy, structural economic reforms and a serious drive against corruption. Over the past twenty years, degradation of the society has become a social phenomenon. But the most serious difficulty facing the clerical regime that runs Iran, a difficulty which has made impossible a continuation of the present state of affairs in the society, is not the economic crisis or its manifestations, not the political crisis or the growing differences between fundamentalists and reformers, but the changes that have taken place in the minds of Iranians. A majority of the Iranian people -and not just the intelligentsia -want freedom. In this respect, freedom of speech has an outstanding role to play. One hundred years ago, modernization came to the ancient Iranian society. It had two faces, a colonial and a human face, and led to the shaping of antagonistic relations between tradition and modernism. Over the past century, this antagonism has been the basis or the activity of cultural, educational, political and social movements in every sphere of life in Iran: from sports, literature and reflections in the field of politics to daily life. Oriental despotism in politics was an ancient tradition of the Iranians, while democracy was borrowed from modernism and the West. Oriental despotism took the shape of despotic rule by the shahs and coercion on the part of the mullahs and the clergy, domination of straitlaced culture and totalitarianism. Along the lines of the contradiction between tradition and modernism, which arose in politics in the form of a contradiction between despotism and democracy, the past century has brought out four trends which, in their struggle against each other, have determined Iran's destiny in politics and in cultural and social life. 1. The monarchists, who stood for economic progress and modernization, but who carried on the cause of oriental despotism in political structures and, thanks to the vast oil revenues in that period, imposed a false and ostentatious modernization on the country. 2. The uncompromising traditionalists, who came out, within the framework of Islamic fundamentalism, against any manifestations of modernization and, relying on the Code of Islamic Legislation, continued the tradition of oriental despotism and coercion on the part of the mullahs and the clergy. They imposed ideological and religious clichés on the people not only in politics, but even in daily life by means of explanations and interpretations which brook of no objection. 3. The trend with more liberal and moderate approaches and interpretations of the fundamentals of Islam desirous of transformations within the framework marked out by the traditional fundamentalists. 4. The fourth trend stands for democracy, for a dignified political system and a de-ideologized state. During the presidential elections, the third trend won a considerable proportion of political plenary powers, but the process of reform, which had the support of a majority of the people, came up against resistance from the fundamentalists, who constitute a majority in the Majles (the Parliament of Iran), who have had the main part to play in the country's ailing, crisis-prone economy, who enjoy the support of Mr Hashemi, the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and who are in command of the police forces, the political police, the army and the Revolutionary Guards. The Iranian people cast their votes for the third trend in the hope that the reformers would be able to implement their aspirations. The religious reformers have also taken steps in this direction. But the society is in much too grave a state of crisis to be able to regard the reformers' short steps, however promising, with any serious hope. Mr Khatami has encountered strong pressure from two sides: from the side of the people, exhausted by the twenty years of all-pervading oppression, and from the side of the fundamentalists, who discern a serious threat to their interests and resist even partial reforms. The president, like most Third World reformers, on the one hand seeks to limit the power of the oppressors and, on the other, fears the growth of people movement, being unable in his confusion to reply to the questions being put to him. Mr Khatami may be constantly holding forth on culture and thinking about intricate present-day philosophical and cultural problems but he is unable, even with the help of Allah and all human knowledge, to find a compromise between the religious power and the Constitution, on the one hand, and democracy and civil liberties, on the other. The undivided power of the mullahs and the clergy, as reflected in the Iranian Constitution and in the Code of Islamic Legislation, stands in an irreconcilable contradiction with the republican form of government and the system of popular suffrage. The Iranian people engaged in a quest for peaceful ways towards democracy, having been tried and tested by the tyranny of the shahs and mullahs, not pinning any hopes on the religious reformers, and recalling the two-year rule of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq and his trustworthy liberal government, overthrown in 1953 as the result of a Shah-CIA conspiracy, have been gradually turning their face towards the fourth trend in the country's politics. The impression of Prime Minister Mosaddeq's positive rule accords with the impression of the fourth political trend. Both branches of government power are worried by the fact that the people have turned towards the fourth trend. Although they have been using diverse political methods to resist the people, nevertheless, after twenty years of undivided mullah rule, the greatest difficulty confronted by both branches of power is presented by the vast changes whose manifestations may be seen on every hand, and especially among women and young people. In this context, not a single problem can be resolved by broad propaganda on the part of the foreign-based opposition, which has been out of touch with the people of Iran for 20 years and does not have a correct understanding of the changes that have occurred within it. The foreign opposition hopes to attract the attention of public circles in Europe and America which are thinking about the Iranian market and cheap Iranian oil. Even with respect to human rights, they keep talking about some kind of cultural proportionality among the Iranians and pin their hopes on Mr Khatami's political trend, which they believe is alone capable of duly resolving Iran's difficulties. Today, after one hundred years of the Iranian people's struggle for democracy, the time has come to resolve the contradiction between tradition and modernization of life in the country. The most formidable problem facing Iran in the conditions in which the authorities are incapable of resolving the political crisis and the internal contradictions consists in a change in the intellectual and political orientation of a majority of the people. One of the causes of the latest killings may be found in the rulers' fear of the people turning towards the fourth political trend. One of the aims of these killings was to destroy the alternative movements which, in the absence of political parties, could perform the role of such parties. Celebrations of the Islamic revolution are being held at a time when the future of the Islamic revolution is shrouded in darkness. The branch of political power headed by Mr Khatami shows signs of a split between the supporters of Mr Rafsanjani ("officials' group") and the religious intelligentsia. Mr Rafsanjani, an ex-president and chairman of the Consultative Council, who is regarded as one of the strongest personalities in the country, sees hope in a return to power as a reformist dictator. He hopes, once chaos breaks, to put down all political forces and to implement a program of agreement with the power structures. The fundamentalists are themselves preparing for a second round of struggle and, with the aid of the Council for Supervision of Compliance with the Constitution (the task of this Council is to establish the powers of candidates for elections to the Majles), hope to prevent candidates supporting the president from taking part in the elections to the Majles. The wing of Mr Khatami's supporters also looks with hope to the future elections to the Majles in order to win a majority in Parliament and so to increase its forces in the face of its rival, although the experience of elections to the city councils shows that this is a most illusory hope. The fundamentalists and the wing of Mr Rafsanjani's supporters assume that as the crisis gathers momentum and the government is unable to resolve the country's economic problems, the people, tired of poverty, unemployment and growing inflation, will lose all faith in Mr Khatami, so paving the way for the formation of a strong government. But the changes in the Iranian people's cultural and educational level and their craving for democracy are so deep-seated that no one can coerce them into dictatorship once again. That is exemplified by the steadfastness and resistance of writers and journalists and by the fact that the people welcome an independent press. Not only in Iran, but also in all the other countries which are deprived of freedom of speech, the mass media and especially the independent press have a greater role to play and are doing very much more than simply conveying information and discussing diverse opinions and judgments. Freedom of publication and release from censorship of any information and of any article signify that the society has stepped outside the narrow framework of the dominant uniform culture. The press of societies downtrodden by dictatorship, because of the absence of political parties and independent people's organizations, offers the only opportunity for voicing the people's aspirations in conditions when radio and television are monopolized by the state. Together with such systems as the Internet, foreign radio stations and the use of satellites, the press overcomes the boundaries of uniformity and despotism with respect to culture. The role and importance of the press and of these systems tends to grow from day to day. Freedom of the press, abolition of book censorship, and freedom of speech in Iran are now demanded by one and all. This tendency opens up a highly promising prospect for Iranian literature. INTRODUCTION \| ESSAYS \| ADVERTISEMENTS \| JOURNALISTS IMPRISONED \| JOURNALISTS KILLED \| DOWNLOADS

The Seeds of Freedom Are Sown in Iran

By Faraj Sarkohi, Iran

A few months prior to February 1978, in the turbulent days of the Islamic revolution, newspaper vendors in Iran had to cope, after years of stagnation, with an onrush of people passionately eager to purchase newspapers. People thronged the streets, demanding freedom. The Shah's censorship machine had to retreat in the face of the people and the journalists, who, almost unable to believe it, gradually came to feel the ever greater power of the printed word and freedom of information. There was an incredible increase in the circulation, delivery, influence and quantity of books and periodicals. The Iranian society rapidly developed in the new atmosphere, in conditions of freedom of speech and free spread of information.

Young talents and intellectuals, who had not cooperated before with the tight-lipped and censorship-stifled press, were now eager to cooperate with it. But within two years of the revolution the new regime was firmly entrenched. The ruling fundamentalists established their undivided domination over culture, reduced culture to the use of simple and stereotyped clichés, monopolized all the mass media, destroyed the independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), foisted on the people a single tightly-knit ideology, and blocked the discussion of different views and opinions and the free circulation of news and information. Before mounting an attack on parties and independent political and trade union organizations, they fell upon the press and book publishing, and imposed an official and unofficial censorship on writers. In 1981, within less than one month, most of the publications were closed down.

In accordance with a statement issued by the revolutionary Islamic prosecutor's office, some 150 newspapers and magazines were closed down and more than 25 writers and journalists were arrested during one night in 1981.

Professional organizations of writers and journalists were outlawed, while the Secretary of the Society of Writers if Iran Said Sultan Pur, a poet whose works called to revolt against oppression, was executed. Journalists were left to sit at home, while the newspaper stalls lost their clients once again. The closure of the free press and the imposition of political and ideological censorship on book publishing opened the way to despotic rule. This time, the ancient tradition of oriental despotism was established within the framework of the tyranny of Islamic fundamentalists in place of the Shah's dictatorship. The outcome was that a century of struggle by the Iranians for modernization and democracy ended without result. But the bitter and painful experience of Shah despotism and the twenty-year sanguinary experience of fundamentalist tyranny showed that the Iranians' age-old dreams of industrialization, modernization, and economic and social progress could not come true without freedom of speech and development of culture, while the revolution in communications had made the establishment of totalitarian power impossible at any rate, in the field of information exchange.

The Islamic Republic have used the most powerful and sophisticated methods of physical and ideological suppression in order to impose an atmosphere of total silence and to turn Iran into a kind of graveyard, but it was nevertheless taken aback by the people movement and the resistance on the part of writers and journalists.

Writers and journalists kept publishing open letters, articles and literary works demanding an end to censorship.

In the most stifling years, writers and journalists sought to combat the despotism in various ways, notably by using Aesopian language in their works. At the Ministry of Islamic Culture, the despotic rulers set up an administration which was to censor all books, especially textbooks. A list of banned expressions, feelings, thoughts and news items was drawn up. Any attempt to ignore the red-pencilled places entailed such punishments as prohibition to write, closure of periodicals, deprivation of the right to literary activity, imprisonment, whipping and capital punishment. Every few years, bodies of writers and journalists with traces of torture were found in deserted localities in the suburbs of towns and cities. Groups of government supporters, either pretending to be independent groups or with the aid of the local police and the government press, used such methods as the planting of explosive devices in the offices of periodicals and the beating up of writers and journalists to create an atmosphere of fear and terror.

The police intensified their pressure on writers and journalists by summoning them to police stations for repeated interrogation. The Ministry of Information and the security police established their control over the safety, the life and even the souls of writers.

A special law was announced under which publication of any edition was only possible upon the receipt of a special permit issued by the Ministry of Islamic Culture after consultations with the Ministry of Information. And it was only a couple of years ago that such a permit, with the exception of three or four cases, the more so with respect to nonpolitical, literary and artistic journals, was issued only to organizations whose loyalty to the regime was beyond doubt.

The Internal Press Administration of the Ministry of Islamic Orientation and the Culture Department of the Ministry of Information are keeping a close watch on printed publications. Holders of licenses for publishing activity make a point of censoring prepared materials, stories and novels of their own accord, either out of loyalty to the government or for fear of the numerous punishments, as announced in the Press Law, which declares as criminal such cases as criticism of the fundamentals of Islam, insult of clerics or the religious leader, or expression of protest with respect to the laws and traditions discriminating against women.

The restrictions in the Press Law are all-embracing and are drawn up in such a way as to allow any interpretation, so that they may be applied to any critical remark. The security police have also given a definite orientation to the press and the work of writers by means of their brutal methods. In May 1998, more than 20 million of the 28 million Iranian voters, in conditions when the country was in the grip of a grave economic crisis, when unemployment and inflation had grown to vast proportions, while the fundamentalists' candidate made promises of rapid growth and prosperity, gave their votes for a candidate who had no economic program and who merely spoke about a liberalization of the political atmosphere, freedom of the press and other sociopolitical freedoms and, of course, about limitations on the clerical system of power.

It is almost a year and a half now since Mr Khatami was elected president, but the censoring of books has continued in the old way, and a license for publishing activity is still being issued to those who are loyal to one of the branches of power or to those who keep their publishing activity within the narrow framework of censorship. Thus, independent professional journalists are deprived of the right to publishing activity and must work in publications operating within the framework of censorship.

The twentieth anniversary of the Islamic revolution is being marked at a time when less than four months have passed since the day of the murder of Dariush Forouhar and his wife Parvane Forouhar, the destruction of the leaders of the Mellyate Iran Party and well-known critics of the despotic regime; since the day of the disappearance and murder of the translator Mohammad Jafar Sharif, the translator and writer Mohammad Paritana, and the poet and writer Mohammad Mokhtari. The two last-named persons were among the active members of the Society of Writers of Iran, among those who over the past 18 years worked to restore Iran's first and most important independent nongovernmental organization, and who had again and again been officially threatened with death.

These murders are not something exceptional. Eighteen years ago, the Ministry of Information and the security police began to carry out illegal killings of critics of the system without the sanction of any court of law. The first in this series was the murder or Kazem Sami, a well-known critic of the despotic regime.

Six years ago, when independent writers came out in protest against censorship by publishing a text entitled "Appeal by 134 Writers", the Ministry of Information murdered the translator Ahmad Mir Alai. And two years ago everything began with the murder of the poet Gofar Hoseini and the kidnapping of the writer Faraj sarkohi, editor-in-chief of an independent socio-literary publication and an activist of the Society of Writers of Iran, who was tortured and then put to death. Freedom was being stifled on an ever greater scale. In all these cases, the crimes were attributed to foreign states and to the opposition. With respect to the latest crimes, however, a different approach became inevitable.

In these days of the 20th anniversary of the Islamic revolution, the press and the sociopolitical circles of Iran speak more often of the latest statement issued by the Ministry of Information of Iran, the political security police and a team of investigators.

As a result of mounting pressure on the part of the people and in view of the protests of world opinion and the contradictions within the regime itself (and these have become especially acute after the election of the new president), the statement said that the latest killings had been carried out by a few officials of the Ministry of Information.

The statement was assessed as positive, but it did not cheer anyone except groups closely allied with the ruling circles. All the available evidence and the experience of people like myself show that the Ministry of Information has become an organization which, acting on instructions from the higher organs of power and under one and the same scenario, repeated from time to time, secretly kills prominent and influential critics of the system and members of the opposition both at home and abroad. Such acts were carried out most brutally against writers and journalists who had sought freedom of activity for their professional organizations and freedom of speech, and who had over the past twenty years protested against the official and unofficial censorship being imposed on the orders of government agencies and through pressure groups.

That is why the demand for participation of a group chosen by independent international organizations such as PEN and by representatives of the Society of Writers of Iran in the investigation of the killings was wholeheartedly supported by the intelligentsia and the people of Iran. But this proposal was rejected even by the political wing of Mr Khatami, which takes a more liberal and balanced attitude to Islam and which is in disagreement with the clandestine killings without trial.

After the elections, owing to such factors as the more liberal frame of mind of the new president and his followers, who have taken control of some power structures, and because of the growing pressure from the people and the persevering struggle of writers and journalists, freedom of speech was enhanced and new publications were issued. More people thronged round the bookstalls in that freer atmosphere. But from the beginning of 1998, the pressure was intensified once again. More than 10 publications were closed down, among them large-circulation newspapers protecting the new president, Mr Khatami, and from time to time carrying items by critics of the regime. Writers were officially warned that they had no right to set up their own trade union organizations. The censoring of books, which had been slightly relaxed, was back to its previous state, and the Minister of Islamic Orientation, who had initially promised to make the situation freer, officially announced that censorship of books and periodicals would be continued.

The election of the new president gave fresh hope of activity by parties, political organizations and trade unions. Women and young people, who had played an important role in holding the elections, hoped that the fierce discrimination against women would be adjusted and that promising prospects would open up before young people. Most of the people hoped that the all-pervading control of the private life of citizens would be limited, nurturing hopes like buds on trees eagerly awaiting their time to blossom.

In foreign policy, the new government seeks to re-establish relations with Europe and America. But in the sphere of relations with America there are a great many obstacles, including stiff resistance on the part of the fundamentalists.

The economic crisis both in he country and in the society is rapidly gathering momentum towards its peak. And while the contribution by young people to the development of the Iranian society is very great, the country now has some 10 million unemployed. Inflation has markedly increased. The shrinking oil revenues and the state's inability to attract foreign capital, corruption in the society, and other economic phenomena have dangerously aggravated the economic and social hardships.

Meanwhile, women and young people stand shoulder to shoulder with the intelligentsia and other social strata demanding democracy, structural economic reforms and a serious drive against corruption. Over the past twenty years, degradation of the society has become a social phenomenon.

But the most serious difficulty facing the clerical regime that runs Iran, a difficulty which has made impossible a continuation of the present state of affairs in the society, is not the economic crisis or its manifestations, not the political crisis or the growing differences between fundamentalists and reformers, but the changes that have taken place in the minds of Iranians. A majority of the Iranian people -and not just the intelligentsia -want freedom. In this respect, freedom of speech has an outstanding role to play.

One hundred years ago, modernization came to the ancient Iranian society. It had two faces, a colonial and a human face, and led to the shaping of antagonistic relations between tradition and modernism. Over the past century, this antagonism has been the basis or the activity of cultural, educational, political and social movements in every sphere of life in Iran: from sports, literature and reflections in the field of politics to daily life.

Oriental despotism in politics was an ancient tradition of the Iranians, while democracy was borrowed from modernism and the West. Oriental despotism took the shape of despotic rule by the shahs and coercion on the part of the mullahs and the clergy, domination of straitlaced culture and totalitarianism.

Along the lines of the contradiction between tradition and modernism, which arose in politics in the form of a contradiction between despotism and democracy, the past century has brought out four trends which, in their struggle against each other, have determined Iran's destiny in politics and in cultural and social life.

1. The monarchists, who stood for economic progress and modernization, but who carried on the cause of oriental despotism in political structures and, thanks to the vast oil revenues in that period, imposed a false and ostentatious modernization on the country.

2. The uncompromising traditionalists, who came out, within the framework of Islamic fundamentalism, against any manifestations of modernization and, relying on the Code of Islamic Legislation, continued the tradition of oriental despotism and coercion on the part of the mullahs and the clergy. They imposed ideological and religious clichés on the people not only in politics, but even in daily life by means of explanations and interpretations which brook of no objection.

3. The trend with more liberal and moderate approaches and interpretations of the fundamentals of Islam desirous of transformations within the framework marked out by the traditional fundamentalists.

4. The fourth trend stands for democracy, for a dignified political system and a de-ideologized state.

During the presidential elections, the third trend won a considerable proportion of political plenary powers, but the process of reform, which had the support of a majority of the people, came up against resistance from the fundamentalists, who constitute a majority in the Majles (the Parliament of Iran), who have had the main part to play in the country's ailing, crisis-prone economy, who enjoy the support of Mr Hashemi, the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and who are in command of the police forces, the political police, the army and the Revolutionary Guards. The Iranian people cast their votes for the third trend in the hope that the reformers would be able to implement their aspirations.

The religious reformers have also taken steps in this direction. But the society is in much too grave a state of crisis to be able to regard the reformers' short steps, however promising, with any serious hope.

Mr Khatami has encountered strong pressure from two sides: from the side of the people, exhausted by the twenty years of all-pervading oppression, and from the side of the fundamentalists, who discern a serious threat to their interests and resist even partial reforms. The president, like most Third World reformers, on the one hand seeks to limit the power of the oppressors and, on the other, fears the growth of people movement, being unable in his confusion to reply to the questions being put to him. Mr Khatami may be constantly holding forth on culture and thinking about intricate present-day philosophical and cultural problems but he is unable, even with the help of Allah and all human knowledge, to find a compromise between the religious power and the Constitution, on the one hand, and democracy and civil liberties, on the other. The undivided power of the mullahs and the clergy, as reflected in the Iranian Constitution and in the Code of Islamic Legislation, stands in an irreconcilable contradiction with the republican form of government and the system of popular suffrage.

The Iranian people engaged in a quest for peaceful ways towards democracy, having been tried and tested by the tyranny of the shahs and mullahs, not pinning any hopes on the religious reformers, and recalling the two-year rule of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq and his trustworthy liberal government, overthrown in 1953 as the result of a Shah-CIA conspiracy, have been gradually turning their face towards the fourth trend in the country's politics.

The impression of Prime Minister Mosaddeq's positive rule accords with the impression of the fourth political trend. Both branches of government power are worried by the fact that the people have turned towards the fourth trend. Although they have been using diverse political methods to resist the people, nevertheless, after twenty years of undivided mullah rule, the greatest difficulty confronted by both branches of power is presented by the vast changes whose manifestations may be seen on every hand, and especially among women and young people.

In this context, not a single problem can be resolved by broad propaganda on the part of the foreign-based opposition, which has been out of touch with the people of Iran for 20 years and does not have a correct understanding of the changes that have occurred within it. The foreign opposition hopes to attract the attention of public circles in Europe and America which are thinking about the Iranian market and cheap Iranian oil. Even with respect to human rights, they keep talking about some kind of cultural proportionality among the Iranians and pin their hopes on Mr Khatami's political trend, which they believe is alone capable of duly resolving Iran's difficulties. Today, after one hundred years of the Iranian people's struggle for democracy, the time has come to resolve the contradiction between tradition and modernization of life in the country.

The most formidable problem facing Iran in the conditions in which the authorities are incapable of resolving the political crisis and the internal contradictions consists in a change in the intellectual and political orientation of a majority of the people. One of the causes of the latest killings may be found in the rulers' fear of the people turning towards the fourth political trend. One of the aims of these killings was to destroy the alternative movements which, in the absence of political parties, could perform the role of such parties.

Celebrations of the Islamic revolution are being held at a time when the future of the Islamic revolution is shrouded in darkness. The branch of political power headed by Mr Khatami shows signs of a split between the supporters of Mr Rafsanjani ("officials' group") and the religious intelligentsia. Mr Rafsanjani, an ex-president and chairman of the Consultative Council, who is regarded as one of the strongest personalities in the country, sees hope in a return to power as a reformist dictator. He hopes, once chaos breaks, to put down all political forces and to implement a program of agreement with the power structures. The fundamentalists are themselves preparing for a second round of struggle and, with the aid of the Council for Supervision of Compliance with the Constitution (the task of this Council is to establish the powers of candidates for elections to the Majles), hope to prevent candidates supporting the president from taking part in the elections to the Majles.

The wing of Mr Khatami's supporters also looks with hope to the future elections to the Majles in order to win a majority in Parliament and so to increase its forces in the face of its rival, although the experience of elections to the city councils shows that this is a most illusory hope.

The fundamentalists and the wing of Mr Rafsanjani's supporters assume that as the crisis gathers momentum and the government is unable to resolve the country's economic problems, the people, tired of poverty, unemployment and growing inflation, will lose all faith in Mr Khatami, so paving the way for the formation of a strong government. But the changes in the Iranian people's cultural and educational level and their craving for democracy are so deep-seated that no one can coerce them into dictatorship once again. That is exemplified by the steadfastness and resistance of writers and journalists and by the fact that the people welcome an independent press.

Not only in Iran, but also in all the other countries which are deprived of freedom of speech, the mass media and especially the independent press have a greater role to play and are doing very much more than simply conveying information and discussing diverse opinions and judgments.

Freedom of publication and release from censorship of any information and of any article signify that the society has stepped outside the narrow framework of the dominant uniform culture.

The press of societies downtrodden by dictatorship, because of the absence of political parties and independent people's organizations, offers the only opportunity for voicing the people's aspirations in conditions when radio and television are monopolized by the state. Together with such systems as the Internet, foreign radio stations and the use of satellites, the press overcomes the boundaries of uniformity and despotism with respect to culture. The role and importance of the press and of these systems tends to grow from day to day.

Freedom of the press, abolition of book censorship, and freedom of speech in Iran are now demanded by one and all. This tendency opens up a highly promising prospect for Iranian literature.